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Text
[*7] Insider trading cases, which are typically prosecuted as securities fraud, carry a mystique rarely present in
securities litigation. As a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York once observed, the cases
1It is no wonder
involve "'basically cops and robbers. . . .[d]id you get the information and did you trade on it?"
that each insider trading case featured in this symposium presents a captivating story. But for two distinct reasons,
2occupies a special place in history. It was the first prosecution under the federal
Chiarella v. United States
securities laws for the crime of insider trading. And the U.S. Supreme Court's iconic holding--regarding the
circumstances under which insider trading constitutes securities fraud--not only profoundly changed the law in 1980
but also continues to define insider trading's contours right up to the present day.
Chiarella's facts are straightforward and memorable. The defendant was employed by a financial printing firm
hired to publish announcements of takeover bids. On several occasions he managed to deduce from code names
the identities of the actual companies, and [*8] then used that confidential information to surreptitiously purchase
3After settling a civil securities fraud action brought by the Securities and
stock in the acquisition targets.
Exchange Commission, Chiarella was indicted in New York federal court for criminal securities fraud, found guilty
by a jury, and unsuccessfully appealed to the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court, however, overturned his
4
conviction.

1

Stephen Labaton and David Leonhardt,
Whispers Inside. Thunder Outside, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002 at C1 (quoting
Otto Obermaier, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York).
2

445 U.S. 222 (1980).

3

Id. at 224.

4

Id. at 225.

While the case is famous, important aspects of Chiarella have gone unnoticed or been long since forgotten. This
essay sets out to explore these aspects in order to better understand how a seemingly mundane SEC settlement
involving just over $ 30,000 in ill-gotten gains morphed into a groundbreaking insider trading prosecution and
Supreme Court decision. The exploration draws from a close analysis of the civil and criminal litigation record as
well as interviews with most of the principal attorneys involved in the case at its various stages, all of whom went on
to extraordinary careers in public service, private practice, or law teaching (with many toggling between two or all
three). This distinguished cadre includes: Stanley S. Arkin, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Ralph C. Ferrara, Robert
B. Fiske, Jr., Paul Gonson, Professor Donald C. Langevoort, Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Lee S. Richards III, John S.
Siffert, and John "Rusty" Wing, and extends as well to their remembrances of Stephen Shapiro.
5The
Insider trading law in the U.S. is routinely depicted as "judge-made" or "judicially created."
[*9] description is apposite. Although Congress statutorily authorized the SEC rule prohibiting "fraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security," it is courts that must determine, as a matter of federal common law,
whether securities trading on the basis of material nonpublic information constitutes a "deceptive device or
6and thus a "fraud"
contrivance" under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
7
within Rule 10b-5's prohibition.
But the description also leaves unacknowledged the essential role of the
SEC, DOJ, and defense attorneys in framing the arguments on which the judicial rulings are based.

Nowhere have attorneys influenced the development of insider trading law more profoundly than in the various
phases of the Chiarella litigation. This story therefore suggests, with no hint of exaggeration, that Chiarella's
indelible impact results as much from the case's lawyering as from the ruling announced by the Court in its
landmark decision.
A. The Path to the First Criminal Conviction for Insider Trading
1. Pandick Press, Vincent Chiarella, and the SEC Settlement
Pandick Press, Inc., located in New York City, regularly provided printing services to corporations and their legal
and financial advisers. On multiple occasions in 1975 and 1976, law firms and investments banks for acquiring
companies hired the printer to publish announcements relating to impending takeovers. Pandick adhered to
standard industry protocol by using code names to identify both its acquisition-company [*10] customer and the
8
target company up until the night of the final printing.
Vincent Chiarella, who was 47 years old at the time, had moved his way up to the position of "mark-up man"
9He was also, as it turns out, an avid stock
during his more than two decades of employment at Pandick.
trader, who regularly spoke with his securities broker. In connection with his work on a mark-up assignment in
September 1975 and four such assignments in 1976, Chiarella managed to decipher the identity of the actual
10He
companies involved in upcoming transactions, based on other facts provided in the takeover materials.
then secretly used that confidential information to purchase stock in the acquisition targets, and within days or

5

See, e.g., Tom McParland,
Judicial Inconsistency Frustrates Purposes of Insider Trading Law, Rakoff Says,
Law.com (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/02/28/judicial-inconsistency-frustrates-purpose-ofinsider-trading-law-rakoff-says/ (quoting Judge Jed Rakoff's observation that the insider trading prohibition has "really been
judge-made law, almost from the very outset").
6

15 U.S.C. 78j(b).

7

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

8

United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978).

9

Brief for Respondent at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1979) (No. 78-1202) (hereinafter
Government Brief).
10

Id. at 7.
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Chiarella

sometimes even hours after his stock purchases, the acquiring companies made their public announcement. On
each occasion the target stock's price rose sharply, and each time Chiarella sold his shares immediately. Chiarella's
sizable profits were possible only because several of his purchases were for substantial amounts of target stock.
His stock purchases in two of the targets, for example, amounted to approximately one-half of each stock's total
11Those large volume purchases on the cusp of takeover announcements caught the
daily trading volume.
12
attention of the New York Stock Exchange, which referred the suspicious activity to the SEC.
The SEC opened an investigation into Chiarella's trading activities in early 1977, and instituted a civil
13The complaint charged Chiarella with violating
[*11] enforcement action in the SDNY a few months later.
Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by purchasing shares in three tender offer targets (Sprague Electronic
Company; Booth Newspapers, Inc.; and Food Town Stores, Inc.) and a fourth company, Riviana Foods, that had
14The complaint further alleged that Chiarella made these stock purchases
been the target of a merger.
"without disclosing the material, non-public information he had obtained in connection with his employment,"
15and thus engaged in a "deceit upon the purchasers and sellers of such securities,"
16resulting in a
17
combined profit of $ 29,248.
[*12] The SEC announced a settlement with Chiarella on the same day it filed the complaint against him,
19Without admitting or
that disposition was only for purposes of the SEC's civil enforcement authority.
denying the SEC's charges against him, Chiarella consented to the issuance of a federal court order enjoining him
from future securities law violations and agreed to disgorge his trading profits to the shareholders who had sold him
20At the time, such injunctive and ancillary equitable remedies were the only relief available to
target stock.
21Congress had yet to enact the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
the SEC in a civil insider trading case.
18but

11

12

See id. at 9 (citing Trial Transcript).
SEC v. Chiarella, Lit. Rel. No. 79357, 1977 SEC Lexis 1674 (May 24, 1977) (hereinafter

Chiarella Lit. Rel.).

13

See Complaint, Civ. Action 77-2534, SEC v. Chiarella (filed May 16, 1977, SDNY, Goettel, J.) The complaint, obtained
from the SEC through a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), is now available in the SEC Historical Society's
Virtual Museum and Archive, at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1977_0516_Chiarella_Complaint_SDNY.pdf.
14

See Chiarella SEC Complaint,
supra note 13, at PP 13, 19, 25, 30. In connection with Chiarella's stock purchases
in tender-offer targets, the SEC also charged him with violating Exchange Act Section 14(e), a general provision prohibiting
fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative practices in connection with tender offers. More than three years later, the SEC adopted
a tender-offer specific insider trading prohibition.
See infra note 132 (discussing SEC Rule 14e-3).
15

Chiarella SEC Complaint,

16

Id. at P 9.

supra note 13, PP 13, 19, 25, 30.

17

Id. at PP 15, 21, 27, 32. Irwin Borowski, Richard S. Kraut, and Peter M. Sullivan were the attorneys who worked on the
Chiarella matter in the SEC's main (Washington, D.C.) office, and William D. Moran was the NY Office's Regional Administrator.
See
Docket
Sheet,
SEC
v.
Chiarella,
77
Civ.
2534
(SDNY,
Goettel,
J.),
available
at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1977_0523_SDNY_Docket_Sheet.pdf.
18

See Chiarella Lit. Rel.,
May 24, 1977 at 61.

supra note 12.

See also S.E.C. Says Typesetter Improperly Used Data, N.Y. TIMES,

19

See id. See also 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (stating the SEC policy "that settlements of any civil enforcement matter may not,
expressly or impliedly, extend to any criminal charges that have been, or may be, brought against any such person or any
recommendation with respect thereto" and observing that criminal proceedings may be instituted only by "the Attorney General
and representatives of the Department of Justice").
20

Chiarella Lit. Rel.,

21

See Chiarella SEC Complaint,

supra note 12.
supra note 13, at I-IV.
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1984, which authorizes the SEC to seek court-ordered penalties of up to three times the profit made or loss avoided
22Pandick Press also administered a punishment of its own: the company
by an insider trading defendant.
fired Chiarella from his position the very same day that the SEC announced the settlement.
[*13] Chiarella was hardly the first worker at a financial printing firm who found himself under SEC scrutiny. In
1974, the SEC filed a complaint, which it ultimately settled, against three employees at Sorg Printing Company,
23As the
Inc., who had likewise engaged in securities trading based on confidential takeover information.
Second Circuit emphasized, the SEC settlement decree in Sorg "aroused widespread concern in the financial
printing industry" and prompted most printers (including Pandick) to post signs in the workplace forbidding
24The signs' warnings, which also were
employees "to use any information learned from a customer's copy."
included as notices on the back of timeclock punch-cards and in union newspapers, advised workers that misuse of
such information could render them liable for "criminal penalties of 5 years in jail and $ 10,000 for each offense."
25In between its enforcement actions against the Sorg employees and Chiarella, the SEC filed at least three other
actions against printer workers, and obtained consent decrees imposing injunctive and disgorgement remedies.
26As the Wall Street Journal and New York Times did on those prior occasions,
27the newspapers reported
28
on Chiarella's SEC settlement.
[*14] 2. The Criminal Indictment
On January 4, 1978, less than eight months after the settlement of the SEC's civil case, the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York indicted Chiarella on 17 counts of willful and knowing misuse of material, nonpublic
29pursuant to the criminal liability provision
information in violation of Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
30
in Exchange Act § 32(a).
Counts 3 through 17 of the indictment roughly tracked the SEC complaint's
allegations concerning Chiarella's purchases of shares in Riviana, Food Town, Booth, and Sprague.

22

Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2A, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (subsequently amended and re-codified at
Exchange Act § 21A(a), 15 U.S.C. 78u-1(a)).
23

See SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., Lit. Rel. No. 6488, 1974 SEC Lexis 2778 (Aug. 21, 1974) (announcing complaint).
See also SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep P 95,034, 1975 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13121 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (observing that the
three employees "have consented to the entry of a preliminary injunction," but granting the printing company's motion for
summary judgment because it was neither "an aider or abettor" nor "secondarily liable on a theory of respondeat superior").
24

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369.

25

Id. (quoting workplace signs at Pandick Press).

26

See id. (citing SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc., Fed Sec L. Rep. P 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Ayoub, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. P 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
See also SEC v. Smith et al., Lit. Release No. 7420, 1976 SEC Lexis 1539 (June 1,
1976) (announcing consent order against three employees of Bowne & Co.).
27

See, e.g., SEC Charges 3 Employees of Bowne & Co., A Printer, With Trading on Insider Data, WALL ST. J., May 25,
1976 at 12;
SEC Charges 2 Brokers, Printer Violated Insider-Trading Rules in Unitek Shares, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1976 at
5 (reporting on complaint filed in Ayoud et al.); Felix Belair, Jr.,
S.E.C. Charges Misuse of Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1974
at 53 (reporting on Song employees complaint).
28

Printing Employee Charged With Gaining from Tender Offer Bid, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1977 at 8;
Typesetter Improperly Used Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1977 at 61.
29
30

See Arnold Lubasch,

S.E.C. Says

Printer is Indicted on Charges of Using Inside Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1978 at D5.

15 U.S.C. 78ff.
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31Counts

1 and 2 raised new allegations charging Chiarella with unlawful purchases in the stock of USM
32
Corporation, generating an additional $ 1019 in profits.
John S. Siffert was the Assistant U.S. Attorney who successfully tried the case to a jury and argued in the Second
Circuit on appeal. Siffert reported to John [*15] "Rusty" Wing, the Chief of the Securities and Business Fraud Unit,
and Robert B. Fiske, Jr., the U.S. Attorney. As Siffert's preparation for Chiarella's trial was underway, Wing left the
SDNY to join the firm of Weil, Gotshal, and Jed Rakoff succeeded Wing as the Fraud Unit Chief. Siffert was not,
however, the AUSA who worked with the grand jury. Rather, Siffert took over the case from John A. Lowe, who left
33It may have been the press reports
the SDNY for private practice a few weeks after Chiarella's indictment.
34
about the SEC settlement that caught Lowe's attention and prompted the criminal investigation.
Then-U.S. Attorney Fiske, now a senior counsel and retired partner at the Davis Polk law firm, remembers well the
SDNY Office's rationale for instituting a criminal insider trading prosecution against Chiarella. Fiske, who describes
35had been aware of the prior SEC enforcement actions
his U.S. Attorney [*16] leadership as "hands-on,"
against workers in the printing industry. He attributed the reoccurring illegality to the inadequacy of existing civil
remedies -- injunctions and disgorgement were simply not serving as deterrents that outweighed the temptation
36Fiske was also
faced by some workers to convert customer information into personal trading profits.
cognizant of the efforts undertaken by the financial printing industry to educate workers that trading securities on
the basis of customer information would violate the federal securities laws and subject offenders to criminal
prosecution. And to his knowledge, no other financial service sector at the time, including investment banks and law
firms, went to the same lengths to warn their employees about insider trading. In Fiske's view, criminal prosecution
was warranted because Chiarella had used customer information to purchase acquisition-target stock
37Siffert likewise recalls
notwithstanding "overwhelmingly powerful notice" of the consequences.
contemporaneous discussions in which Fiske emphasized to him the perniciousness of the printing industry's
insider-trading problem as well as the incremental steps taken by the SEC and the industry itself prior to Chiarella's
38
indictment.

31

See Indictment, United States v. Chiarella, No. 78 Cr. 2 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 4, 1978, Owen, J.), available at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1978_0101_Chiarella_Indictment_SDNY.pdf.
32

33

Id.
Telephone interview with John S. Siffert, Co-Founding Partner, Lankler Siffert Wohl (Sept. 6, 2019).

34

See Roundtable on Enforcement at 104, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Sept. 25, 2002),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/programs/enforcementTranscript.pdf (statement by former SEC Solicitor Paul Gonson
suggesting that an AUSA "had read about the settlement in the newspaper . . . and indicted Mr. Chiarella for the action the SEC
had settled").
But see JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO
PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES 77 (2017) (book passage attributing the origins of Chiarella's criminal prosecution to a telephone
referral from SEC Enforcement Director Stanley Sporkin to Jed Rakoff). It is unlikely that the criminal case arose from Sporkin's
encouragement. Jed Rakoff, who became Chief of the SDNY's Securities and Business Fraud Unit after the preparation for
Chiraella's criminal trial had already begun, was not involved in the indictment decision. Interview with the Honorable Jed Rakoff,
SDNY District Judge (Oct. 30, 2019). And neither Robert Fiske nor Rusty Wing recalls Sporkin referring the matter to them.
Telephone interview with Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Senior Counsel, Davis Polk & Wardwell (Oct. 28, 2019); Siffert Telephone
interview,
supra note 33.
35

36

37

38

See ROBERT B. FISKE JR., PROSECUTOR, DEFENDER, COUNSELOR: A MEMOIR 80 (2014).
Fiske telephone interview,

supra note 34.

Id.
Siffert interview,

supra note 33.
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A pause here is useful for counterfactual speculation. As the U.S. Attorney, Fiske allowed higher-level review of
preliminary indictment decisions if so requested by defense counsel, including his own review as a final appeal.
39But Stanley Arkin, the attorney who represented Chiarella during the criminal trial and through his successful
petition to the Supreme Court, [*17] was not involved in the case at the preliminary stage. Had the timing been
otherwise, Arkin believes that he would have been able to mount a persuasive case against an indictment.
40Now a legend in the white-collar defense bar known for his tenacity, Arkin at the time was building a premier small
law firm practice, which he has maintained for more than fifty years, except for a four-year stint in the early 1990s
41
as a partner at the firm of Chadbourne & Parke.
While criminal liability for insider trading would be a powerful deterrent, the government's decision to press forward
in a contested proceeding risked establishing an adverse precedent that could apply in civil insider trading cases as
well. Because Chiarella had no pre-existing relationship with the acquisition targets or their shareholders, the
criminal prosecution had to be built on untilled soil. From a securities-law development perspective, fewer risks
would have been posed with an inaugural criminal insider trading action against a traditional insider of the issuing
corporation rather than an "outsider" like Chiarella. A criminal prosecution of that type would have been a natural
42the landmark Second Circuit decision from a decade earlier that
follow-up to SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
held directors, officers, and employees of a mining company liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for their
purchases of stock in the company based on material nonpublic information concerning a valuable ore strike.
43To be sure, the en banc opinion included a statement that "anyone in possession of material inside information
must either disclose it to [*18] the investing public. . .or. . .must abstain from trading in or recommending [such]
44But that broad statement was technically dictum and was never the basis of a post- TGS court
securities."
45
holding.
The risk of an unfavorable precedent also could have been reduced by initiating Rule 10b-5
"outsider trading" charges in a litigated SEC enforcement action, rather than in a criminal action with the
defendant's imprisonment as a possible outcome. That is, building upon the discussion of "improperly obtained"
informational asymmetries in Commissioner Richard Smith's
In re Investors Management Co. concurrence,
46the SEC could have urged courts to recognize a Rule 10b-5 duty owed to all securities issuers "not to steal or
knowingly receive stolen goods or exercise dominion over goods known to be owned by others . . . even without the
47
presence of a special [insider] relationship."
3. The Motion to Dismiss and the Jury Trial

39

FISKE,

40

Interview with Stanley S. Arkin, founding member of Arkin Solbakken (Oct. 30, 2019).

supra note 35, at 80.

41

See Peter Truell,
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998 at D1.
42

Riding Shotgun for Wall Street; Combative Lawyer for Aggressive Brokers is in Demand, N.Y.

SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 979 (1969).

43

Id. at 847-48.

44

Id. at 848.

45

See Donald C. Langevoort,
From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two Duties, 71 S.M.U. L. REV. 835,
843, 841 (2018) (concluding that in the decade following
TGS, Rule 10b-5's duty to disclose or abstain "was clearly
becoming status-based, not possession-based," but acknowledging the concurrences in SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc.,
407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) and the "smatterings of [other] evidence that market egalitarianism was a serious judicial
philosophy").
46

In re Inv'rs Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 650 (1971) (Smith, Comm'r, concurring in the result).

47

Id. at 650 n.2.

Page 6 of 20

In addition to a defendant who had been warned repeatedly about the possible criminal repercussions of insider
trading, the prosecutors in Chiarella had what is often difficult to obtain in an insider trading case: tangible (as
opposed to circumstantial) evidence that securities were purchased on the basis of material
[*19] nonpublic
information. Specifically, Chiarella signed a statement on his application to the NY Department of Labor for
unemployment benefits admitting that he was discharged from Pandick "for misusing confidential information and
48
that 'the allegation is true.'"
The strength of the government's evidence, however, did not deter Arkin from seeking SDNY District Judge
Richard Owen's dismissal of the indictment on the ground that it failed to state a criminal offense, or alternatively,
49Arkin's principal argument was that
for an order dismissing the indictment "in the interest of justice."
Chiarella's "actions did not constitute even a civil violation of § 10(b)--and Rule 10b-5--much less a criminal
violation" because Chiarella "was not in a fiduciary relationship as to anyone so that he had no duty of disclosure
50But in the end of March 1978, Judge Owen ruled
prior to purchasing shares in the target corporation."
otherwise, concluding that the government had adequately stated a claim for two separate but related frauds in
connection with Chiarella's stock purchases. First, Chiarella was charged with committing a "fraud upon the
acquiring corporations whose plans and
[*20] information [Chiarella] took while he was setting them in type."
51Judge Owen noted here that "the analogy of embezzlement by a bank employee immediately springs to mind,
52In addition, Judge Owen held that, if proven,
and, of course, embezzlement implies fraudulent conduct."
"Chiarella's failure to disclose his purloined information to the sellers whose stock he purchased constituted an
53
'inherent unfairness' and a 'deceptive device" in connection with his purchases."
Chiarella's week-long trial commenced in April 1978. AUSA Siffert introduced into evidence the workplace signs as
well as the warning notices in union newsletters and on Chiarella's time-clock punch-cards. Siffert also called nine
witnesses for the government, including an investigator in the SEC's New York Regional Office, Carmine Asselta,
and former shareholders in the target companies' stock who testified that they were unaware of the impending
takeover at the time of their sales and would not have sold had the information been disclosed to them. Because
the SEC's civil case against Chiarella was settled at the complaint stage, it was Siffert and Asselta who gathered
almost all of the prosecution's evidence, and Asselta also prepared the stock price charts for the jury that
54In defending against the securities fraud charges, Arkin
highlighted Chiarella's substantial trading gains.
offered Chiarella's direct testimony and sought to convince the jury that while Chiarella was aware that his use of
55Among
customer information violated company rules, "he did not believe that his actions were unlawful."
other justifications for his conduct, Arkin maintained that Chiarella was "well aware that it was the common
[*21] practice of prospective tender offerors to purchase shares on the open market prior to the announcement of

48

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1372 (quoting statement, and ultimately ruling on appeal that any state-created privilege
pertaining to statements made in applying for unemployment benefits was not controlling in a federal criminal proceeding).
49

United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y 1978).

50

Id. at 96. Arkin continued to emphasize this fiduciary-focused interpretation of Rule 10b-5's insider trading prohibition at
every stage of the litigation.
See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 21-22, Chiarella v. United States, filed June 28, 1979
(describing the "essence of the common law rule [for] a tort action for fraud by silence [as lying] where one party to a business
transaction fails to disclose facts material to the transaction that the other party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
special relation of trust and confidence between them") (citing cases and ALI Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts § 551(2)(a)).
51

Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. at 97.

52

Id. at 96.

53

Id. at 97 (quoting

In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) and the text of Exchange Act § 10(b)).

54

Telephone interview of John S. Siffert,

55

Brief for the Petitioner,

supra note 33.

supra note 50, at 7.
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56As Chiarella stated it in his testimony: "I was doing the same thing that they were
their tender offer plans."
57Chiarella also repeatedly denied having
doing and I had no intention of doing anything wrong with that."
read any of Pandick Press's multiple notices with explicit warnings of the criminal consequences, notwithstanding
his acknowledgment on cross-examination by Siffert that he would have passed the workplace signs when he
58The charges to the jury centered on Chiarella's nondisclosures to
clocked in and out more than 640 times.
the sellers of the targets' stock. Although Siffert had requested a separate charge that Chiarella had also defrauded
the offering companies, Judge Owen rejected the request, apparently siding with Arkin's position that any reference
"to an alleged fraud on the offering company would be inappropriate as a substantial variance from what the grand
59
jury allowed."
60A month later, Judge
A jury convicted Chiarella of all 17 counts of securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.
Owen sentenced him to concurrent terms of one year on most of the counts, which were suspended following one
61At the sentencing hearing, Judge Owen
month of imprisonment and a probationary term of five years.
found that Chiarella's testimony that he had not read the workplace notices "was perjury beyond a reasonable
62One can speculate as to whether the jury would
doubt."
[*22] have convicted Chiarella had he
acknowledged reading the workplace notices and admitted to disregarding them--perhaps viewing the warnings as
a scare tactic by an employer that sought to encourage compliance with workplace rules. On the other hand, Siffert
extracted on cross-examination two other key statements that could have convinced a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that Chiarella acted both knowingly and willfully: when Siffert asked if he knew it was against the law to trade
on insider information Chiarella said "I didn't know it was a criminal law. . . . It was a violation as far as I knew;" and
63
Chiarella admitted that he knew use of insider information "was against the SEC."

4. The Second Circuit's Ruling on Appeal
The Second Circuit's decision upholding Chiarella's conviction is often depicted as an "equal access to
64It is an approach that is difficult to reconcile
information" approach to Rule 10b-5 insider trading liability.
65Under
with the doctrine of common law fraud, which loosely governs judicial interpretations of Rule 10b-5.
the common law, in the absence of a duty to disclose, a person's mere silence about material facts in a business
transaction does not constitute a fraud. In other words, the principle of
caveat emptor generally applies to
securities trading.

56

Id. at 8.

57

Id. (quoting trial transcript at R. 492).

58

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369.

59

See Transcript of Chiarella Charging Conference, April
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1978_1231_Chiarella_Charging_Conf_SDNY.pdf.
60

See US Convicts Printer for Securities Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1978 at 57.

61

See Chiarella Government Brief,

62

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369-70 n. 18.

63

See Chiarella Government Brief,

64

See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Powell's statements in

1978,

available

at

supra note 9, at 4.

supra note 9, at 11 (quoting Trial Transcript at 515-16).

65

Chiarella).

See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasizing that "[i]n general, the case law developed in this Court with respect to § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 has been based on
doctrines with which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law doctrines of fraud and deceit").
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[*23] But a close reading of the Second Circuit's November 1978 opinion shows that the appellate court did not
affirm Chiarella's Rule 10b-5 conviction based on the breach of a generalized disclosure duty arising from a
securities trader's mere possession of material nonpublic information. Instead, the Second Circuit held more
narrowly that "[a]nyone--corporate insider or not--who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not
66And the Second
use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."
Circuit explicitly stated that it was " not to be understood as holding that no one may trade on nonpublic market
67As Professor Donald Langevoort has recently emphasized,
information without incurring a duty to disclose."
the Second Circuit's approach in Chiarella was "status-based" and constituted "an effort to prevent abuse-wrongfully exploiting the status of regular access to information by knowing that the information was not theirs for
68
the taking."
B. Lawyer Advocacy: Framing the Issues
1. Chiarella's Petition for Certiorari and the Government's Opposition
After unsuccessful motions for a Second Circuit rehearing or a rehearing en banc, Arkin filed Chiarella's petition
69The first and principal question presented to the Court was:
for certiorari in early February 1979.
[*24] Does the purchaser of stock in the open market who fails to disclose material, nonpublic information
about the issuer of the stock violate Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 where the
purchaser has no fiduciary relationship with the issuer and where the information was obtained from and
70
created by a source wholly outside and unrelated to the issuer?

The petition also presented a question concerning the constitutional due process implications of the "Second
Circuit's retroactive application of its new and expansive interpretation" of the statutory prohibitions. In addition,
Chiarella appealed on issues related to the trial court's jury instruction on the requisite intent for criminal securities
fraud and its ruling admitting into evidence Chiarella's signed statement from his NY State application for
71
unemployment benefits.
72Given that the
The Solicitor General's Office filed its brief in opposition at the end of March 1979.
government was opposing a petition from the first person ever sentenced to prison for a Rule 10b-5 insider trading
violation, its opposition brief was surprisingly concise. The brief's argument section ran just over seven pages (in
contrast to Stanley Arkin's twenty pages of client advocacy). It is likewise surprising that the Second Circuit's
"regularly receives" limitation appeared [*25] nowhere in the government's brief. Instead, the brief advanced the
broad dictum from the Second Circuit's 1971 Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, which observed that "Section 10(b) and

66

Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365 (emphasis added).

67

Id. at 1366 (emphasis added).

68

Langevoort,

supra note 45, at 846.

69

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chiarella v. United States, No. 78-1202 (filed Feb. 2, 1979), available at http://www.sechis
torical.org/collection/papers/1970/1979_0202_Chiarella_Cert_Petition_SupCt.pdf. Arkin's law partner, Mark S. Arisohn, was cocounsel on the certiorari petition,
see id., and the Supreme Court litigation, with Arthur T. Cambouris's assistance on the
Merits Brief.
Supra note 50.
70
71

Id. at 2.
Id.

72

Brief for the United States in Opposition to Certiorari, Chiarella v. United States, No. 78-1202 (Mar. 29. 1979) (filed by
Solicitor General Wade McCree, Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann, and DOJ Attorneys Sidney Glazer and Sara
Criscitelli), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1979_0329_Chiarella_Opp_Cert_SupCt.pdf
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Rule 10b-5 have long been interpreted to protect 'the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
73Had the
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.'"
government's opposition brief tracked more closely the Second Circuit's actual holding in
Chiarella, which
effectively imposed a disclosure duty only on securities market participants and their agents, it is possible that the
case would not have garnered the four votes necessary for the Court's grant of certiorari.
2. The Solicitor General's Misappropriation Theory Arguments
74both the intensity and the
Once the Supreme Court granted Chiarella's petition for certiorari in May 1979,
substance of the government's advocacy changed. This transformation can be attributed to the then-Deputy
Solicitor General Frank Easterbrook, who described his "portfolio [as] essentially all miscellaneous civil litigation
75As Judge Easterbrook remembers it, his reaction to the government's
that included antitrust and securities."
equal access argument was that it did not make sense:

What? Huh? How can that possibly be right? . . . I mean if you didn't have a rule that people could trade on
different [*26] amounts of information, there's no incentive to collect the information. If there's no incentive to
collect the information, markets won't be efficient. So I looked at that, and I said, "This can't possibly be right,"
and handed the papers off to Steve Shapiro who was then an assistant and who was going to succeed me as
76
the economic deputy in a few months.

Easterbrook also vividly recalls his office's strategy for proceeding with the case. Notwithstanding its refusal to
defend Chiarella's conviction on any type of equal access grounds, Easterbrook felt strongly that an argument
based on property rights could be successful:
[W]e were willing to defend the conviction on a different argument,. . . which was that information about what
transactions you were going to engage in, in securities markets, is property. Everybody understands that
copyrights and patents and other trade secrets and trademarks and so on are species of property. Well, there's
absolutely no reason why a bidder in a case like this couldn't have property rights in information. . .
So Steve and I proposed [an argument based on] a misappropriation of property rights. . . . And all you need
was fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. There was the necessary connection, . . . This
was fraud, and that could be the basis of a conviction...
So there we were. We took that as the line, and the case was briefed during [*27] the period just as I was
about to go out the door and hand the case over to Steve. But Steve and I worked on the brief together, and I
77
then vamoosed. I think Steve argued the case himself when the time came. . . .

More recently, in a tribute to Stephen Shapiro's legacy, Easterbrook described the
Chiarella brief's
78And indeed it was a long game, as the Court waited
misappropriation approach as playing "the long game."

73
74

Id. at 5 (quoting

Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847-48).

Chiarella v. United States, 441 U.S. 942 (cert. granted, May 14, 1979).

75

Dr. Kenneth Durr,
Oral History--The Honorable Frank Easterbrook at 5, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Jan.13, 2011),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oral-histories/20110113_Easterbrook_Frank_T.pdf.
76

Id. at 13.

77

Id. at 14-16.

78

Kathy Agonis,
Steve Shapiro's Legacy in the Courtroom and Beyond, THE CIRCUIT RIDER at 5 (Nov. 2018)
(discussing Judge Easterbrook's recollections regarding the merit briefs and oral argument in
Chiarella).
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more than 17 years to rule on the validity of an insider trading theory rooted in a defendant's misappropriation of
property:
But [the Court] never came to a conclusion on [the misappropriation theory] because . . . [the Court] didn't
think it had been preserved. . . . So nothing could happen on that because Steve and I had made it up, no
79
getting around that, sorry.

To be sure, the government brief's misappropriation approach tracked one of the Rule 10b-5 liability theories
80as well as the
advanced by Judge Owen, when he denied Chiarella's motion to dismiss the indictment,
"stolen goods" analogy suggested in Commissioner Smith's
Investment Management
[*28] concurrence.
81But Judge Easterbrook can rightly lay claim to the development of a property-rights rationale that justifies reading
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prohibit the use of misappropriated information in securities transactions.
82Although several securities law scholars continue to advance the Easterbrook view that property-rights protection
83others (including
offers the most convincing policy justification for a federal insider trading prohibition,
myself) bolster our readings of the statutory text with policy arguments instead directed at fostering market integrity
84
and promoting investor confidence in the securities markets.
The arguments in the Solicitor General's brief in Chiarella ultimately resulted from a collaborative effort. The
SEC's Principal Associate General Counsel Paul Gonson worked closely with Shapiro and Deputy Solicitor
85Shapiro also sought input from AUSA John Siffert
[*29] General Kenneth Geller to develop an initial draft.
and included him with the SG's attorneys on the brief. Shapiro, who subsequently founded and led the Mayer
Brown law firm's appellate practice group, is remembered as a brilliant and inspirational attorney, whose generosity
of spirit ensured a place for Gonson and Siffert at the government's counsel table at the Supreme Court oral
86
argument.
Due in large part to Shapiro's ingenuity, the government's brief advanced two distinct versions of a Rule 10b-5
misappropriation theory. That is, the government argued that Chiarella had "committed fraud against both the

79

Oral History--The Honorable
Frank Easterbrook, supra note 75, at 16;
text (discussing the Court's 1997 decision in United States v. O'Hagan).

see infra note 122 and accompanying

80

See supra note 51 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Owen's holding that the indictment stated a claim that
Chiarella defrauded "the acquiring corporations whose plans and information he took while he was setting them in type").
81

See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Prior to
Investment Management, courts in insider-trading claims
brought under state law had also begun to recognize a corporation's property interest in its own material nonpublic information.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498 (1969) (holding that "a corporate fiduciary, who is entrusted with
potentially valuable information, may not appropriate that asset for his own use even though, in so doing, he causes no injury to
the corporation").
82

See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Information, 1981 S. CT. REV. (1981).

Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of

83

See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY (1991); Stephen M.
Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH.& LEE L. REV.
1189 (1995).
84

See Donna M. Nagy,
Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan
Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1264-70 (1998) (discussing the competing rationales for the federal insider-trading
prohibition).
85

Telephone Interview with Paul Gonson, SEC Solicitor 1979-1999 (Aug.19, 2019).

86

Telephone interview with Siffert,

supra note 33; Telephone interview with Gonson,
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supra note 85.

acquiring corporations whose information he converted and the investors who sold him securities in ignorance of
87Specifically, the government contended that Chiarella's
forthcoming market events of critical importance."
"secret conversion of confidential information operated as a fraud on the corporation that entrusted him with that
88and also that his "purchases of securities based on material nonpublic information obtained by
information"
89The support for this second argument,
misappropriation constituted fraud on the sellers of those securities."
which grounded the Rule 10b-5 disclosure duty in wrongfully obtained informational asymmetries, was drawn from
90That 1871 English
the common law, and in particular from the English case of Phillips v. Homfray.
decision discarded the caveat emptor principle when the
[*30] purchaser in a real estate transaction had
91The government's
obtained his informational advantage through an unlawful trespass on the seller's land.
brief also provided an economic basis for the recognition of a common law disclosure duty in instances involving
92
wrongfully acquired information.
The Second Circuit's "regular access" approach to insider trading liability was thus essentially orphaned at this
93Indeed, the government's brief expressly sided with the Securities
critical stage of the Chiarella litigation.
Industry Association's amicus curiae concern that a liability focus on persons who regularly receive material
nonpublic information might be misconstrued to suggest that "mere possession . . .of confidential market
information precludes market professionals (such as market makers, specialists, arbitrageurs, and block traders)
94And that government-SIA alliance left the Court without
from carrying on their normal business activities."
an advocate "pointing out the consequences of [a] 'fiduciary duty only' test" and pushing for an alternative theory of
95
liability based on one's structural access to material, nonpublic information.
[*21] 3. Chiarella's Reply Brief
In his client's reply brief, Stanley Arkin called out the government for adopting "a new theory" that effectively
"abandoned" the "regular access to market information" basis on which the Second Circuit affirmed Chiarella's
96And in Arkin's view, that Second Circuit "regular access" approach was itself an implicit rejection
conviction.
of what he contended was the district court's reasoning that "Chiarella was under the same duty as a classic
97After setting out arguments
'insider' to disclose material, nonpublic information to selling stockholders."
addressed to the merits of each of the government's misappropriation theories (namely, the fraud-on-the-source
theory lacked the requite "in connection with" nexus to a securities transaction, and the fraud-on-investors theory
98the reply brief argued that the government's proposed new interpretation of
lacked adequate precedent),

87

Chiarella Government Brief,

88

Id. at 28.

89

Id. at 38-39.

90

supra note 9, at 24 (emphasis added).

6 Ch. App. 770 (Eng. 1871).

91

Chiarella Government Brief,

92

supra note 9, at 41 (citing Phillips v. Homfray, 6 Ch. App. 770 (Eng. 1871)).

Id. at 42 (citing Anthony Kronman,

Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 1,

9 (1978)).
93

See Langevoort,
supra note 45, at 847 (observing that the government "essentially bet all the marbles on treating
Chiarella's behavior as a misappropriation, and hence a fraud").
94

Chiarella Government Brief,
supra note 9, at 70-71 n. 48 (discussing Brief
Industry Association, Chiarella v. United States, filed June 29, 1979).

Amicus Curiae of the Securities

95

Langevoort,

96

Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2 (filed Oct. 31, 1979), Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

97

Id.

supra note 45, at 847.
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Rule 10b-5 "'cannot be employed to uphold these convictions,' because the jury that convicted Chiarella was never
99Specifically, the reply contended that "there was no charge
charged that it must find facts now essential."
about a failure to disclose to the offeror corporation (the non-disclosure charge given had to do with the selling
shareholders); nor was there a charge requiring a finding that Chiarella tortiously acquired his information."
100

[*32] 4. The Oral Arguments Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Chiarella case on November 5, 1979, and Arkin and Shapiro
101Underscoring
each made masterful presentations that were punctuated by the justices' probing questions.
the arguments set out in their merit briefs, Arkin emphasized that Chiarella bore "no fiduciary relation to [any]
102Shapiro, in turn, highlighted that Chiarella's "use of converted nonprospective seller" of target stock.
public market information to enrich himself in the stock market without disclosure to anyone was a deceptive device
103
within the prohibition of the statute and the rule."
In the course of the questioning, Chief Justice Burger lodged hypotheticals at Arkin concerning securities trading
on the basis of misappropriated information by court-house personnel including a judge's secretary and a court's
104It is likely that Burger had in mind a "leaking" scandal in the Court's own print shop just seven
bailiff.
months prior, involving a typesetter who was reportedly fired for sharing with a journalist "premature word of court
105
decisions."
[*33] The oral argument also gave Justice Powell the opportunity to foreshadow his subsequent tipper/tippee
106Powell asked Shapiro about the Rule 10b-5 liability consequences for an
liability ruling in Dirks v. SEC.
investment analyst who advises his client to buy an issuer's securities after having paid "a visit to a corporation [to]
107That securities-analysts colloquy
obtain[] more current estimates for the year than are available generally."
continued for several minutes with Justice Rehnquist interjecting questions as well. Justice Powell emphatically
rejected Shapiro's suggestion that investment research fits within a conventional tipper/tippee paradigm, observing

98

Id. at 1-9.

99

Id. at 10 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971).

100

Id. (citing trial court's jury instructions).

101

Oral Argument, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1202 (hereinafter
Chiarella Oral Argument).
102

Id. at 00:01:00-15.

103

Id. at 00:33:17-30.

104

Id. at 00:16:05-12.

105

222

(1980)

(No.

78-1202),

Oyez,

Richard Carelli,
Burger Fires Printing Aide After News Leak, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1979 at A4 (referencing "a
stormy confrontation in Burger's chambers, during which Burger accused the employee of 'leaking' information" to [an] ABC
correspondent"). Notably, in his
Chiarella dissent, the Chief Justice contended that "Congress cannot have intended one
standard of fair dealing for 'white collar' insiders and another for the 'blue collar' level." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
241 (1980) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). As reflected in correspondence with one of his law clerks, Justice Harry Blackmun was "not
sure [he] like[d] the blue-collar/white collar comment" in Burger's dissent and "suspected this comes rather close to [the Chief's]
justified annoyance at the several leaks that have taken place with respect to the Court's work on several occasions. . .".
See
Memorandum from Justice Harry Blackmun to Mark Rahdert re: Chiarella v. United States (Feb. 4, 1980), available at
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1980/1980_0204_BlackmunDecision.pdf.
106

107

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Chiarella Oral Argument

supra note 101, at 00:44:23-40.
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that "corporate executives . . .talk about [their] company all the time" and that "[t]he country is full of analysts and
108
investment advisers who try to understand what is going on in corporations."
C. The Chiarella Decision and Its Aftermath
1. The Supreme Court's Opinion
At this point the Chiarella story becomes familiar again, although several new observations are warranted. In
place of what Justice Powell categorized as the Second [*34] Circuit's "equal access" approach to insider trading
109As Arkin's merits brief had
liability, the Court entrenched what came to be known as the "classical theory."
urged, the majority construed insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to turn on the breach of "a
duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."
110Accordingly, Chiarella's conviction had to be vacated because he had "no prior dealings" with the shareholders
whose stock he purchased. As the Court emphasized, "[h]e was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, [and he
was] in fact a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions."
111Powell's approach in
Chiarella was no doubt fueled by his own legal experience with counseling corporate
112But it is also clear that the
officials and his particular "distaste for the abuse of trust of insider trading."
fiduciary limitation emphasized by Arkin in his brief and at oral argument readily provided a doctrinal pathway that
allowed the Court to announce a broad prohibition of [*35] insider trading by officers, directors, and other agents
113
of an issuing corporation (as well as their tippees) while allowing Chiarella to trade with impunity.
The Chiarella majority also did not rule on the validity of either of the government's misappropriation theories
because, as Arkin had urged, it concluded that neither theory had been properly presented to the jury as an
114A misappropriation theory alternative, however, was
independent basis for finding a Rule 10b-5 violation.
discussed by five justices in separate concurring or dissenting opinions, four of whom agreed with the government

108
109

Id. at 00:47:12-36.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).

110

Id. at 229. As Stanley Arkin had suggested in Petitioner's Merits Brief,
see supra note 50, Justice Powell's majority
opinion invoked the fiduciary-based exception in § 551(2)(a) of the Restatement 2nd of Torts--with no reference to any of the
other four common law bases for recognizing affirmative disclosure obligations in business transactions.
See Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 228.
See Donna M. Nagy,
Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315,
1325 (2009) (calling attention to Justice Blackmun's observation that the fifth exception in the Restatement "would have
supported a disclosure duty 'where one party's superior knowledge of essential facts renders a transaction without disclosure
inherently unfair'") (quoting
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting.)
111

112

Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 233.

A.C. Pritchard,
841, 947 (2003).

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L. J.

113

A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson,
Securities Law in the Sixties: The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the
Triumph of Purpose over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 402-03 (2018) (observing that Powell seized upon "traditional
notions of fiduciary duty as [a] doctrinal tool to confine the SEC's aggressive interpretations").
114

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 229.
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that persons who unlawfully misappropriate information owe a disclosure duty to the investors with whom they
115
trade.
It was Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in
investors" misappropriation theory. He opined that:

Chiarella that most clearly elucidated a broad "fraud-on-

[*36] As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction has an obligation to disclose
information to the other unless the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation. This rule permits a
businessman to capitalize on his experience and skill in securing and evaluating relevant information; it
provides incentive for hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting. But the policies that underlie the rule
should also limit its scope. In particular, the rule should give way when an informational advantage is obtained,
116
not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means.

To support his view of the requirements at common law, Chief Justice Burger quoted or cited many of the
117Maintaining that the district court's instructions to the jury charged
Government brief's primary sources.
"misappropriation with sufficient precision," Burger concluded that Chiarella owed the target shareholders a duty to
disclose or to refrain from trading by virtue of the fact that he "misappropriated--stole to put it bluntly--valuable
118This disclosure duty would therefore
nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence."
apply regardless of whether the misappropriator stood in a relationship of trust and confidence with the
information's source.
The fifth member of the Court inclined toward a misappropriation approach was Justice John Paul Stevens, who
favored instead the government's "fraud-on-the-source" theory. He maintained that "[r]espectable arguments could
be made" that Chiarella's action [*37] constituted a fraud on the acquiring companies that entrusted confidential
tender offer information to his employer, and that this deception occurred "in connection with the purchase or sale
119Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, and the favorable statements he made during the
of any security."
120thus provided support for a narrower approach that would predicate the Rule 10bChiarella oral argument,
5 fraud on a fiduciary's secret self-serving use of information belonging to a principal. Justice Stevens deemed the
121That day came in 1997 when the
Court wise for "leav[ing] the resolution of this issue for another day."
122
Court decided United States v. O'Hagan,
a criminal insider trading action against a law firm partner who
had purchased target-company stock based on confidential information that he misappropriated from his firm and its
acquiring-company client. With a six justice majority, the O'Hagan Court resoundingly endorsed a fraud-on-thesource misappropriation theory, with a fiduciary principle at its core.

115

See id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (endorsing a broad misappropriation theory, but agreeing
with the majority that misappropriation instructions had not been presented to the jury);
id. at 239-43 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
(endorsing a broad version of the misappropriation theory and contending that the theory was properly presented to the jury);
id. at 245-46 (Blackmun, J, joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (endorsing an equal access approach--citing Victor Brudney,
Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979) but noting
that Chiarella's trading on misappropriated confidential information "is the most dramatic evidence that [he] was guilty of fraud").
116
117

Id. at 239-40.
Id.

118

Id. at 245.

119

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J. concurring).

120

Chiarella Oral Argument,

121

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J. concurring).

122

supra note 101, at 00:49:15-35.

521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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2. The SEC's Response to the Chiarella Decision
Despite their disappointment with the Court's decision to reverse Chiarella's conviction, SEC officials, particularly
those in the Office of the General Counsel, found much to like in Justice Powell's majority opinion. They were
especially gratified by the Court's strong endorsement of In re Cady Roberts, the SEC's 1961 decision in an
administrative proceeding against a broker who had purchased stock based on material nonpublic information
123They were likewise encouraged by the
relayed to him by a director of the issuing corporation.
[*38] Court's willingness to uphold the Second Circuit's reasoning in Texas Gulf Sulphur, at least insofar as it
applied to traditional insiders, who owe duties of trust and confidence to the corporation's shareholders.
124SEC officials were also heartened with the majority's determination to leave open the validity of both
125
misappropriation theories that the government had raised in its brief.
Notwithstanding those bright spots in the Chiarella opinion, SEC officials also perceived some disquiet from the
justices over the fact that neither Congress nor the SEC had expressly prohibited insider trading through lawmaking
or rulemaking. Indeed, Justice Powell included in his opinion an ominous footnote questioning whether any broader
approach to insider trading liability would give "either criminal or civil defendants . . .fair notice that they have
126Ralph Ferrara, the SEC's General Counsel, determined that the timing was
engaged in illegal activity."
right to swiftly move forward with a rulemaking solution that would provide securities traders with helpful clarity while
127
strengthening the SEC's ability to react to future trading abuses by outsider traders like Chiarella.
SEC Associate General Counsel Robert Pozen and Special Counsel Donald Langevoort thereafter worked with
Ferrara to propose the Commission expressly adopt an insider trading rule. The rule would not only build upon the
precedents in Cady Roberts, Texas Gulf
[*39] Sulphur, and Chiarella, but would also incorporate the two
misappropriation theories that were outlined in Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger's opinions. The result was
unofficially dubbed "Rule 10b-X," a trifurcated rule that would prohibit securities trading while in possession of
material nonpublic information: (1) in breach of a duty of trust and confidence that is owed to the securities issuer or
its shareholders; (2) in breach of a duty of trust and confidence that is owed to the source of the material nonpublic
information; or (3) in breach of a disclosure duty that is owed to traders on the other side of a transaction because
128The proposed rule would
the information was obtained through fraud, deception, or other unlawful means.
likewise have prohibited such persons from advising others respecting the purchase or sale of securities.
Rule 10b-X, however, never made it past the Commission-proposal stage. The Office of the General Counsel
proposed the rule for Commission action in early May 1980--less than two months after the Court's Chiarella
129But the Enforcement Division offered its own proposal, and the Divisions of Corporation Finance,
decision.
Investment Management, and Market Regulation jointly proposed to the Commission a third alternative. The
Commission instead determined to move forward with a broad insider trading prohibition that applied only in the
context of material nonpublic information pertaining to a tender offer. That prohibition, drafted initially by the Division

123

In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

124

Telephone Interview with Donald Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center (Sept. 5, 2019).
125

126

Gonson telephone interview,

supra note 85.

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 n. 20.

127

Interview with Ralph Ferrara, Partner, Proskauer Rose LLP (Nov.18, 2019); Donna Nagy,
Oral History--Professor
Donald Langevoort at 25-26, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Feb. 11, 2020), http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oralhistories/OralHistories_DonLangevoort_T.pdf.
128

Id.

129

Id.
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130and
of Corporation Finance and ultimately codified as Rule 14e-3, had been in the works for many years,
131
was published for public comment six months prior to the [*40] Chiarella decision.
Getting Rule 14e-3
to the finish line became the SEC's top insider-trading rulemaking priority, and several months later the Commission
132Nearly twenty years elapsed before the SEC would again take up rulemaking in
voted to adopt the rule.
133
the area of insider trading--with projects far more limited in scope.

3. The Fate of the Dual Misappropriation Theories
With four justices supporting a broad fraud-on-investors version of the misappropriation theory, and only one
justice endorsing the narrower fraud-on-the-source version, the broader approach was arguably the one better
positioned for judicial acceptance. But like SEC rulemaking in the wake of the Chiarella decision, the narrower
approach was the one that advanced, first in dozens of lower court civil and criminal cases beginning with United
134and then in 1997 before the Supreme Court in O'Hagan.
135The why and the
States v. Newman,
how constitutes the final part of this Chiarella story.
The tipping and trading activity in Newman provided the first post- Chiarella opportunity to seek a court ruling in
a misappropriation case against outsiders
[*41] who did not owe duties of trust and confidence to the issuing
corporation's shareholders. Prior to the indictment's presentation to the grand jury in February 1981, AUSA Lee
136With assistance from SEC Special Counsel Donald Langevoort,
Richards sought input from the SEC.
Richards crafted an indictment that included explicit misappropriation charges against Jacques Courtois and Adrian
Antoniu, the investment bankers who had tipped confidential takeover related information to several trading co137Using Justice Stevens's concurrence
conspirators, including James Mitchell Newman, a securities broker.
in Chiarella as a guide, Richards also took care to explicitly reference the duties of trust and confidence that
Courtois and Antoniu owed to their respective employers, Morgan Stanley and Kuhn, Loeb, as well as to categorize
the investment bankers' tipping and Newman's trading as a Rule 10b-5 fraud against their firms and their firms'
138Chief Justice Burger's fraud-on-investors misappropriation theory, however,
acquiring-company clients.
"was deliberately not pursued in Newman" principally because "[i]t was considered too confusing to present to the
139Not only was the fraud-on-the-source theory deemed
jury in tandem with the fraud on the source theory."
the simpler of the two to explain, it was also favored by Richards because it retained Chiarella's focus on fiduciary
disclosure duties and could be supported with a battery of related precedents from mail and wire fraud
140 [*42] After the Second Circuit upheld the indictment in its 1981 ruling (the indictment
prosecutions.
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John Huber,
Oral History--Richard Rowe at 33-34, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (May 24, 2004),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oral-histories/rowe052404Tanscript.pdf.
131

Exchange Act Release No. 34-16385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70349 (Nov. 19, 1979).

132

Adoption of Rule 14e-3, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60410 (September 4, 1980).

133

See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) P 86,319, at 83,692 (Aug. 15, 2000) (adopting Rule 10b5-1's affirmative defenses for pre-existing trading plans and
Rule 10b5-2's enumeration of circumstances that qualify for the fraud-on-the-source misappropriation theory).
134

135
136

664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Telephone interview with Lee S. Richards III, co-founding partner, Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP (Feb. 14, 2020).

137

United States v. Courtois et al. Indictment (S 81 Cr.
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1980/1981_0101_Newman_Indictment.pdf.
138

139

53,

Feb.

1981),

available

at

Id.

Donald C. Langevoort,
CORP. L. 865, 883 (1995).

Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J.
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141the case
charged violations of the mail fraud and conspiracy statutes, in addition to Rule 10b-5),
proceeded to a five-week trial, and Richards successfully obtained convictions against all of the
Newman
142
defendants who had not previously pled guilty.

To be sure, Newman's (and, years later, O'Hagan's) fraud-on-the-source misappropriation approach to Rule
10b-5 liability plugged many of the gaping holes left open by the classical theory articulated by Justice Powell in
Chiarella. But the fraud-on-the-source theory leaves substantial gaps of its own that would be filled with a broader
misappropriation theory recognizing disclosure duties owed to opposite-side traders when information has been
improperly obtained. For instance, if the government in O'Hagan had set out to play "the long game" by advancing
Chief Justice Burger's theory alongside of its fiduciary-focused fraud-on-the source misappropriation theory, the
Deputy Solicitor General's oral argument would not have conceded Rule 10b-5's inability to reach a non-fiduciary
143Nor would
thief who "stole [a] lawyer's briefcase" and traded securities on its confidential information.
[*43] federal courts today have to expand fiduciary principles almost beyond recognition to prevent other
misappropriators and their tippees from being unjustly enriched from their knowing use of wrongfully obtained
144Viewing contemporaneous traders as the actual parties defrauded by a misappropriator's
information.
deception also avoids the perception that the fraud-on-the-source theory is merely a pretext for employing the
145
Chiarella-rejected equal access approach.
[*44] Had circumstances been otherwise, the SEC may well have championed a broader misappropriation theory
in its own civil insider trading actions. But in the initial aftermath of
Chiarella, the SEC's outsider-trading
misappropriation cases were settled rather than litigated, as civil insider trading actions were apt to do,

140

141

Richards telephone interview,

supra note 136.

See United States v, Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 14 (2d. Cir 1981).

142

JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 134-83 (1987) (recounting the SDNY's investigation and prosecution of
"insider trading at Morgan Stanley"). The district court's post-conviction rulings were affirmed on appeal, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.
1983), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
See Newman v. United States, 464 U.S. 683 (1983) (referencing statement
from Justice Powell that he would have granted certiorari),
143

Oral Argument at 00:03:10-20, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-842 (last visited Mar 3, 2020) at 00:03:10-20 (hypothetical question posed by Justice
Sandra O'Connor).
Cf. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing between a Rule 10b-5 insider trading
claim involving active deception such as "misrepresenting one's identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise
off limits," from one involving "mere theft" such as exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to gain unauthorized access into a
computer).
144

See Nagy,
supra note 110, at 1340-48 (discussing the "growing number of courts [that] simply disregard [the
Supreme Court's] fiduciary dictate when it forecloses liability against a defendant who has traded securities based on wrongfully
acquired information").
145

See id. at 1375 (discussing scholarly criticism directed at
O'Hagan's misappropriation theory). The government's
brief in
O'Hagan made no mention of an alternative misappropriation theory--a fact noted in Justice Ginsburg's majority
opinion.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n. 6 (referencing the Burger approach and observing that "[t]he Government does not
propose that we adopt a misappropriation theory of that breadth"). But "the long game" does appear to have been in mind a
decade earlier in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), an insider trading and tipping case prosecuted on the theory
that a
Wall Street Journal reporter's misappropriation of information from his forthcoming columns deceived and defrauded
his newspaper-employer within the meaning of Rule 10b-5. In a footnote in its merit brief in
Carpenter, the government set
out what it described as "Chief Justice Burger's legal theory" and argued that because "the government plainly alleged and
proved" the secret fraudulent use of the information misappropriated from the Journal, it was unnecessary "for the indictment to
explicate the legal theory that such conduct violates the securities laws because of its effect on other investors and the integrity
of the market." Brief for the United States, Carpenter v. United States (No. 86-422) at n.40. While the Court was unanimous in
upholding the defendants' convictions for mail and wire fraud, the Court was "evenly divided" (4-4) on the defendants' Rule 10b5 convictions and simply "affirm[ed] the judgment below on those counts."
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 52.
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146particularly

at a time when the SEC lacked statutory authority to seek court-ordered monetary penalties.
SEC did, however, concisely reference the broader misappropriation theory in the amicus brief it filed in
148It then, once again as an amicus in the Second Circuit, set out a
support of the government in Newman.
149a Rule 10b-5 private action by an investor who had
full-throttled argument in Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
unwittingly sold target stock at the same time that Newman was purchasing that stock based on the confidential
150The SEC's amicus brief supported
takeover information that Courtois and Antoniu had misappropriated.
the plaintiff's entitlement to damages and urged
[*45] acceptance of the fraud-on-investors misappropriation
151But the appellate court upheld the district court's order dismissing the
theory "left open" in Chiarella.
case, concluding that the selling shareholder had not been deceived and defrauded by the defendants because,
under the majority opinion in
Chiarella, "defendants owed no duty of disclosure to plaintiff Moss."
152Although Congress effectively overturned that result a few years later by amending the Exchange Act to provide
contemporaneous traders, in both classical and misappropriation theory cases, with an express right of action under
153 Moss's holding that shareholders are not owed a disclosure duty by an outsider trading on
Section 20A,
154After the SEC's
misappropriated information continued to be cited with approval.
[*46] amicus loss in
Moss, and against the backdrop of several litigation fraud-on-the-source victories--beginning with SEC v. Materia
155the SEC's prior allegiance to the broader
(involving yet another printer-employee misappropriation),
misappropriation theory soon faded away.
147The

Because the Supreme Court has never been asked directly to rule upon the validity of Chief Justice Burger's
misappropriation approach to insider trading liability, the theory is technically "left open" to this day. But while lower
federal courts can still broaden their reading of the common law in Rule 10b-5 cases to recognize disclosure
obligations in situations involving wrongfully obtained information, the chances that an individual district judge or

146

See, e.g., SEC v. Wyman, Lit. Rel. 9311, 22 SEC Docket 391 (SDNY Feb. 20, 1981) (consent order involving trading
in target stock based on information alleged to have been misappropriated by a paralegal at the acquiring company's law firm)
(cited in Donald C. Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 49 (1982)).
147

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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See Brief for the SEC as
Amicus Curiae at 26 n. 33, United States v. Newman (81-1225) (filed June 29, 1981),
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1980/1981_0629_SEC_Amicus_Curiae_Newman.pdf.
149
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719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id.

151

Brief of the Securities Exchange Commission,
Amicus Curiae, at 1-22, Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983) (No. 83-7120) (filed April 4, 1983), available at 1983 WL 486617.
152

Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.

153

15 U.S.C. § 78u-1.

154

See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 445 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that "the Second Circuit correctly rejected Chief
Justice Burger's version of the misappropriation theory as contrary to the holdings in
Chiarella and
Dirks") (citing Moss v.
Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983)).
But see United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986)
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).Without so much as mentioning
Moss's holding three years earlier, the
Second Circuit maintained that because the reporter and his tippees breached a duty of confidentiality owed to the
Wall
Street Journal, these defendants "had
a corollary duty, which they breached, under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5, to abstain
from trading in securities on the basis of the misappropriated information or to do so only upon making adequate
disclosure
to those with whom they traded."
Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1034 (emphasis added). Because Judge Walter Mansfield sat on
both panels and voted with the majority each time, the tension between
Moss's holding and
Carpenter's recognition of a
"corollary duty" is particularly confounding.
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SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d. Cir. 1984).
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appellate court panel would do so is remote. The Court itself declined that opportunity recently in Salman v. United
156preferring instead to issue a unanimous decision that only further entrenched its prior classical and
States,
157
misappropriation approaches.
The best solution to this quandary would be for lawmakers to enact an explicit insider trading prohibition that would
unmoor the offense from its current fraud-based rubric. And Congress is already halfway there: by a landslide vote
(410-13) in December 2019, the House of Representatives passed an artfully crafted bill that would prohibit
securities trading while a
[*47] person is aware of "wrongfully obtained" material nonpublic information.
158But the proposed legislation is logjammed in the Senate--perhaps indefinitely, if past is prologue.
159Thus,
Chiarella's indelible impact on insider trading law could well continue for generations to come.
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Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016) (affirming Rule 10b-5 conviction of a tippee who purchased securities on
the basis of information that he knew had been misappropriated from his brother-in-law's investment bank employer and the
bank's clients).
157

See Eric C. Chaffee,
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 847, 863 (2018) (lamenting that
Salman offered the Court an "opportunity to remake federal
securities regulation in the area of insider trading, and once again the Court chose to preserve the status quo created by existing
precedent").
See also Langevoort,
supra note 45; Nagy,
supra notes 84 and 110 (favoring Chief Justice Burger's
approach).
158

Insider Trading Prohibition Act, HR 2534, 116th Cong (introduced by Rep. Jim Himes (D-Conn.) and passed by the US
House of Representatives, December 5, 2019.
159

See id. (referred to the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on December 9, 2019). HR
2534's language builds from similar legislative efforts in the 1980s, which were ultimately abandoned.
See Nagy,
supra
note 110, at 1367-68 (discussing the proposed "Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987," among other unsuccessful attempts
at legislative reform).
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